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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PSYCHOLOGY AND IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

(SECOND ARTICLE.)

IN the March issue of this REVIEW,¹ in the course of an article on Psychology and Idealistic Philosophy, I spoke about a point of view from which a correlation might be made between two readings of human experience, that taken by the classical idealistic philosophy and that which is being taken by some of the more recent departures in psychological research.

To effect a correlation between two things so different requires some interpretation of each of them. Of idealistic philosophy interpretation is comparatively easy. Its monuments are raised. Its records are there to be read. Of the other movement, which differs in that its records are in the making and its work hardly more than begun, interpretation is naturally more difficult—more hazardous. Even to speak of a ‘reading of human experience’ which it is alleged to be taking, will be already to suggest prematurity of judgment to many minds.

These circumstances are probably not, however, such as should put our enterprise out of court. It might be otherwise with an enterprise of another kind. An elaborate project of *detailed* correlation, between the story regarding the various departments or functions of the mind which is disclosed in recent psychology, and the general view taken by the older metaphysic on the same subject would certainly be premature and could probably only belong to a time when philosophy had both enterprises before it in some completeness. But the possibility is not ruled out that a

¹ Vol. XXX, 2, pp. 170-177.

correlation which is general, and which yet is helpful and genuine (in the sense that the connecting lines of it run not merely from periphery to periphery of the things correlated but straight from centre to centre), could be effected even now.

Such a possibility is what is intended to be suggested by these articles. The link which we would expose lies between the fundamental hypotheses regarding the mind's nature, operative in the two cases. We believe that the two have bearings which are significant. As stated in the former article, we think that something which is important to the idealistic philosopher may be found to be a legitimate corollary of the discoveries of recent pathological and therapeutic psychology. The only proviso is that we keep to genuine discoveries and a sane interpretation of them. The corollary when explicitly stated is to the effect that apparently there was, after all, a certain 'salvation' in the kind of thing that Idealism had aimed at.

Dissent from this statement—*i.e.*, dissent from the interpretation of Idealism involved in it—might take the form either of denying that idealistic philosophy is ever interested in 'salvation' at all; or of alleging that the version which the statement involves of the kind of thing it aimed at is laboured or distorted or otherwise false.

We shall come to the latter suggestion in a moment. As regards the former it is no doubt feasible and tolerably orthodox to say roundly that the search for 'salvation' is no part of the business of philosophy, and that philosophy when it knew its business was in no way concerned therewith. But a very little consideration seems to show the hastiness of this view. Whatever we may have to say about philosophy in its search for the true, it is surely plain that nothing can serve it for the good, which is not efficiently good. The Good must in some sense 'save' if it is to be the Good. If on being lifted up it fails to draw all men unto it, then it is not the Good. Any philosophy which was to have revealed the true Good has failed, if it has failed to speak with power. Now Idealism, ever since Socrates first gave it shape and direction, has had its story to offer of the true Good. It has therefore had to take its stand upon its effectiveness quite as much as

upon its veracity. In revealing the true Good it has placed itself at the equal mercy of a critic who could sustain the charge either that its true Good was not true, or that it was not really good. It is with regard to his defence against the second of these charges that there is something interesting to the idealist in the new psychology. Without contending that recent psychological researches corroborate the idealistic true Good's truth—its true-ness to the metaphysical nature of things—we do contend that roughly and generally, but yet significantly, in their effort to find goodness they have been pointing towards the place where Idealism by all its history has been impelled to seek it. These researches seem to find the idealist's True Good good, whether they may find it metaphysically true or not.¹

We do not think this thesis rests on any mistake as to the place where Idealism has been impelled to seek goodness, either. Roughly and popularly speaking, the idealist has found 'good' in the Absolute, while the psycho-therapist has found it simply in being well, whatever that means. But that there is a connecting link between the two meanings, will be our main contention in the present paper. The link in question is no other than the attitude or condition of mind which is natural and native to man's civilized estate. What is characteristically operative there, is also what is operative in both the things we are trying to bring together. To see the mutual bearings of the two we have but to relate both to this centre; we have to bring, on the one hand, idealistic metaphysic, and on the other hand the methods and results of therapeutic psychology, into relation with the facts of the normal mental life of what we are here calling man's civilized estate.

Popular modes of speaking apart,² where, let us ask, has Idealism really found the ideal or goodness? Being a metaphysic, it is a version of the whole of things. The question therefore concerns the whole. What version—what supposedly true version—of the whole of things has Idealism ventured to pronounce good?

¹ I trust it may not appear strange to speak thus simply about the therapists' 'effort to find goodness' or their endeavor to put people on the track of 'the Good.' That surely is their business if words have any meaning.

² By popular modes of speaking I mean such statements as that Idealism finds its ideal in the Absolute.

The idealism of which we are speaking is what came to light in the post-Kantian, Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian episode in the history of Western thought. We shall give ourselves the best chance to see where it actually found goodness if we can succeed in obtaining something like a properly internal view of the drift of that philosophy. And this is largely a matter of interpretation of philosophical history. We may obtain it most conveniently by reading Hegel in the light of the literal historical genesis of his thought.

Where had the post-Kantian Idealism eventually found ideal goodness? It is easy to gather from the whole spirit of Hegel's writings—in whom this Idealism had at length tolerably defined its programme—where, to him, the actual pinch of the idealist's burden lay, in what end-term the idealist sought his portion and reward. His task was to reveal the ideal in ultimate reality. But his task more particularly was to reveal in the ultimate a full measure of articulateness without thereby prejudicing its ideal character. This was his port. This was the desired goal of his thinking. And the instrument wherewith he compasses the task is, as we shall contend, something which when examined proves to be one in nature with the informing spirit and impulse of that normal mental life which appertains to man's civilized estate—that actual normality of life which the therapist values and is always trying to sustain or restore. The idealist in order to reach his 'Absolute' uses the very process which produces that.

That reality should be articulate and, so to say, speakable, without thereby becoming the less ideal—this, we have said, is the demand of Idealism, so far as Hegel is an exponent of it. This is the result which the Hegelian approach to the problem of metaphysics is believed by Hegel himself to secure. A failure to articulate would have been, for him, complete failure. Its failure to articulate had actually been, in his estimation, the one signal failure of the method in the hands of its earlier sponsors. This was the defect, pre-eminently of Schelling. Schelling had had plenty of Idealism about him. But he had given way to his predilection for mystic rapture, hoping thereby to reach the truth of

philosophy. Hegel could have no truck with this. He had no use for a truth which "He giveth his beloved in sleep." What is given in sleep—Scripture notwithstanding—is "mostly dreams" to him. The world must be articulately spirit or it is not spirit. The spirituality which is to be found in it by philosophy is not to be anything merely leapt-to or guessed-at or otherwise mysteriously intuited. It is to be really found. That thing which Hegel meant Idealism to be is first found actually attempted by him in *Die Phenomenologie des Geistes*, that earliest and in many ways most significant of his works, his "voyage of discovery" as he called it. Wherein did Hegel mean to be distinctive here? It was in that, while others had been equally with him interested in the spirituality of things, there was for him no satisfactory Idealism unless he could better their accounts in a double way. On the one hand, in vulgar parlance, he must 'get there' as they had not done. He must produce the idealistic goods. And yet he must also be true to the real world as they had not been. His system must better both Fichte and Schelling in the directions in which they were respectively strong. A more convincing (because less narrow) exhibition of the power of the ideal than had been possible to Fichte:—that was one side of the demand. A version of the facts of the universe which should have more verisimilitude than that contained in any of Schelling's versions:—that was the other side of it. The result—the *Phenomenologie*—is a work idealistic in the sense that it aims to represent the universe as spiritual; but one which almost staggers under a sense of the wealth of variety of subordinate modes into which the dominant note of spirituality is diffracted.

Hegel, then, stands for a spirituality which shall be articulate. The process of articulating it, is philosophy. And there is something apt even in the metaphor under which he describes the operation. It is a voyage.

What kind of a thing exactly was it, then, that was supposed to lie at the farther end and reward the voyager by coming home to him in the guise of this 'articulate spirituality,' as we have called it?

In the simplest terms to which we can any further reduce it, we would seem compelled to take it as being just that peculiarly

baffling double thing which Plato indicated as his Idea of the Good, namely, an ultimate truth of the world which was a perfection of the soul at the same time. Now—to state our main thesis again—as far as regards its being the truth of the world, no kind of corroboration or contradiction is to be expected from the new psychology; it not being a metaphysic. *But that all perfection of the soul lies that way, would seem to be its very testimony.* That way seems to lie the very port which the therapist wants to make. That way—though perhaps not so far on in the way—seems to lie the normality of life in man's civilized estate which, to the therapist, is well-being. In the last resort, to set the soul achieving normality of life is to set it going along the same line which leads out upon the Hegelian philosophic voyage.

But that is only, we must at once add, in so far as the Hegelian voyager is competent, in one department of his undertaking. For while his progress is intended to be, literally speaking, a logical progress (revealing the truth of things) there is something peculiar about the logic. If we might so express it, it is a logic not of theory only but of practice. It is the exercise of a reason which is both theoretical and practical reason.¹ Its actual historical spring and point of origin is, as we believe due research would show, precisely the meeting-point of these two in Kant. We must look briefly into the historical point since much turns on it.

We have spoken of this pilgrim's progress of idealistic philosophy as an adventure of "finding the world to be spiritual." Hegel presented his age with a logic of this enterprise, the most successful story of it amongst many rival accounts of the same general kind, which that age produced. At that time most thinkers of the front rank, for almost a generation past, had been ambitious to do the kind of thing which Hegel's logic for a period persuaded many that it had successfully accomplished.

The original hint towards the whole line of development had been detected by Fichte in Kant, in that undertaking of Kant's

¹ Compare Wallace on "Two Ages of Reason" in *Prolegomena to Hegel's Logic*.

which remained, in the view of his successors, his central effort, the deduction of the categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the deduction of the categories Kant had begun something whose ultimate effect, for his successors, was to enable them in ways of their own to demonstrate the essential spirituality of things. They would have been willing to allow that, in a simple crude sense, this was even a true description of Kant's conscious aim; which was, as is well agreed upon, to show how the whole realm of fact with which knowledge has to do, is what it is only through certain constructive work done by the mind upon a given sense-material. What remained to be wrought out, as Kant's successors conceived the situation, was the logic of that construction. Kant had not wrought it out. He had not, as they put it, been able to show why the work of construction—the categorising process—should have proceeded in just those ways which Kant mentions and no others, why the categories should be just of that number and no more, and so on. Kant's own view of the case had indeed been somewhat different. He had been very conscious of these requirements. He even thought he had fulfilled them. He himself believed it to be intelligible why there should be just this system of categories and no others, and he thought he had shown it necessary. And while in truth he over-estimated his philosophical prowess in this respect—as did also his successors theirs—he had yet actually planted the living principle of a new logic, and this is what interests us here; a new logic which Fichte and later Hegel actually worked out, the one into his *Wissenschaftslehre* and the other into his *Logik*. All this logical work was the succession's own doing. But the principle of it was Kant's discovery.

And the manner of its discovery already showed up that peculiar nature in it which makes possible the correlation of the Idealism which came out of it with the psychology of today. The manner of its discovery would appear to have been somewhat thus. With the help of Aristotle and others, Kant had got together the categories under which “all things in general”¹ are comprised; which showed him the lines of construction of the ob-

¹ A favourite Wolffian phrase.

jective field of knowledge; and the categories themselves fell, with him, into groups of two. But in process of handling them, on translating them into constructive form and so forth, he seemed further to find an impulsion resident in each pair, to combine and produce a third. And the magic of it, one gathers, was not without its thrill; at least, if one may judge by the kind of bewitched admiration with which the discoverer contemplates these processes and recounts them to himself and to his reader.

Every pair of categories precipitated a third. "Thus Totality," as he observes, "is nothing but Plurality contemplated as Unity." "Limitation," he goes on, "is merely Reality combined with Negation." And so with the two remaining pairs. "Community is the Causality of a Substance . . . and Necessity is nothing but Existence which is given through Possibility itself."¹

Plainly, there is something germinative here. Yet Kant will still have it that we are dealing in a kind of logic. The impulsion is still logical. If so it must be in some new way or sense. This Kant will allow. It is in fact what he wants to say. He will have it that this is a logic of the mind's original categorising activity, as distinct from a logic of the mere concatenation of the dead products of that activity—"transcendental" is the word he wishes us to use. What exactly is happening to logic at the hands of this wizard? The answer is that *into the fabric of its ancient story is beginning to be inwoven a portrayal of human destiny.*

We say there is a beginning of some such thing here. Let us note the simple manner of it, and we shall see that it is not any more than a beginning. On four different occasions two categories are shown logically to precipitate a third. That is all. The phenomenon is barely recognized. There is no system of it. There is no suspicion of there being further secrets to discover; of there being, let us say, any similar precipitation of triad two by triad one, or of triad three by triad two, or the like; nor is there much articulation of the process within a triad. Now Hegel simply strides into this field after others have been at the problem, as one intending to master this mystery, get to the bottom of the whole occult process, find just what begins, what precipitates

¹ § 11, *Critique of Pure Reason.*

what, by what necessity it all goes forward and in what it all ends. Thus did the germinative principle, stumbled upon in Kant's "deduction," blossom into that unique phenomenon in the history of philosophy, the post-Kantian dialectic, the *Sichselbstwerden* of the Absolute.

The eventual result is the emergence of that changed conception of logic in which the name begins to suggest something other than before, namely, something which points or drives forward towards the idealistic goal; the place where for Idealism ideality, genuine desirability, ultimate goodness lies. There were two features about it. (a) It had necessity and was in that way sincerely named logic. At the same time, it was in this sense more than a merely intellectual affair:—that (b) its historical point of origin was a virtual de-theoreticising of logic, a *rapprochement* between logic and life. And the movement from that point to the presupposition that life was logic, was a genuine development of it.

(a) Post-Kantian Idealism was a logic. It purported to be the story of a universal and necessary process. If Kant, in common with his successors, was engaged in finding the world to be spiritual or ideal, the radical difference between him and them was that while both found objectivity to be a system of structures within structures, he placed the spirituality less in the structures than in their maker. Kant did not fully see the interior life going on within the structures themselves; although, as just said, he did at points; namely, within each separate one of the four triads into which the categories fell. He saw there how, mysteriously, two united to precipitate a third, saw it and was much entertained. "Thus Totality is nothing else but Plurality contemplated as Unity," etc.¹ Hegel shows the process fully come to its own. He presents us with a panorama—or, in the *Logic*, with a skeleton picture—of all the multitudinous structures within structures involved in the completely constituted whole of the world of experience. He shows each, not as anything dead but as a living category; its life being manifested in this, that if posited with

¹ Kant inserted these *artige Betrachtungen*, as he calls them, only later. They do not appear in the first edition of the *Critique*.

sufficient seriousness it can be felt precipitating an other—not, as in Kant, always uniting with an other to precipitate a third but itself precipitating an other opposite to itself, with which it must then be reconciled *in* a third. The category is of such nature that to enter into it and refuse to go on and posit the other, the opposite, or to refuse subsequently to go on and seek the reconciliation of the opposites in a third, is impossible without doing violence to the felt constitution of our minds. Moreover, the triads themselves are connected. This successful third subsequently discloses the same germinative quality, producing an opposite and seeking reconciliation with it; so that, for the intelligent mind there is no rest from the process of transition short of the ultimate construction of things as ideal or as the Absolute Idea. And we have to recognize as further evidence of the superior completeness of the Hegelian system, that as the mind once begun cannot refuse to go on, so it cannot choose but begin. For it cannot be serious with even the most elementary orientation toward the world which it can take, it cannot be consistent with even the barest assumption of Being, without finding that it is caught in the forward movement. Being will demand an other, it and the other will proceed to demand a synthesis of their opposition in a third, and the third will recommence the process.

What, literally speaking, are the various stages in this process, the several categories? The best answer would seem to be that each of them represents the summing-up of a possible mind's total address to the universe—its general characterization of the whole of things. The various possible minds—or possible phases in the development of one mind, for either expression serves—are at different levels; they are higher or lower on a scale. They reflect the universe with varying degrees of adequacy. But each is a characterization of things as a whole. Thus from the standpoint of one, the universe *is* Being. From that of another it is Naught. To one a little higher in the scale than either of these it is a realm of Becoming. The same with all the rubrics, World of Appearance, Mechanism, Chemism, Life, Knowledge, the Absolute Idea. They are formulae under which the whole-content of the universe is comprised. And Hegel will exhibit the ne-

cessity, at once of positing and of subsequently transcending all of them except the ultimate one, which is alone really adequate, self contained, out of need of modification further, and the goal of the pilgrimage. Such is the process into which the intelligent individual mind, once caught, must go forward, if it would remain true to its own nature; and it is a process in which, according to the theory, it is the mind's very nature to be caught.

But (*b*) from the moment Kant first discovered the ultimate act of synthesis, the constructive deed that knowledge really was, and suggested that there was a logic of *this*, logic became no longer formal, theoretical, but something which must be called theoretical and practical at once.

To express it otherwise:—in its knowing Kant had seen the soul *working*. And it was working, Fichte and Hegel added, *at its destiny*.

The origin of the post-Kantian dialectic is often associated, and rightly, with the story of the antinomies; those contradictions which brought home to Kant the phenomenal character of the world of space and time; contradictions from which we were to be delivered by recognizing the space and time world as phenomenal. The later dialectic is rightly regarded as having been aimed at the full working out of the whole gamut of such contradictions. But it is fatal to forget that this entire process, inwardly viewed, is but a letting of the synthetic act play itself out. The key to our difficulties, says Kant, is that we should recognize the phenomenal character of the space and time world. But 'phenomenal' means 'transcendentally constructed.' And it was upon the act of construction that Fichte seized; it was the eternal doing of the synthetic act that was Schelling's mystic rapture; and it was this same constructive function of the spirit that Hegel would articulate, would give to realise its 'freedom,' and would show as sane. And when Fichte calls upon a man to rise to the idea of his calling, to be a free man, if he would hope ever at all to be a philosopher, he is calling for the original synthetic act whereof the *Wissenschaftslehre* is the expression or the playing-

out. When, with him the Kantian call to recognize the phenomenality of things gets to be apparently mixed up with a challenge to be logical, and that again with a challenge simply to be a moral being, Kant need not turn in his grave. He is not being belied by his intrepid disciple. This in-weaving of destiny into logic, this mixing up of logic with the self-positing of life, this psychologising of logic if we may use the phrase, was genuinely begun by Kant. It was his very contribution. That categorising of the given which he seized upon, was an operation; it was an operation upon sense-impressions in the last resort perfectly continuous with that other practical operation upon sense-impulses through which man achieved, and through which it was 'categorically imperative' that he should achieve, his destiny. Kant's idealistic successors brought the two sides of the operation together. Their story of the universe might be under-written 'The perfecting of the soul, the revelation of the world,' the process being on both its sides a logical process. This was not only the essence of their endeavor but the explanation of their charm. Man is interested in his destiny. In the last resort, perhaps, in nothing else. He is interested in it, especially in the presence of what he calls "the hard logic of things"; the latter having a derivative interest as the platform on which his destiny is to be wrought out, as the sum of the obstacles to be negotiated, as that total of resistance which man's practice has to get the better of. The peculiar seductiveness of the idealistic construction was that it seemed to reveal, in the very being-there of all which natural science discloses, the soul itself in activity; so that the existence of all, even the hardest and most ungenial elements of it, was but the singing by the spirit of man of the deeper basic notes of its own very song. As Hegel put it, under another metaphor, "Man is himself at once the field of battle and both the combatants." It was a new and fascinating thought that the spirit of man could travel *via* the logic of reality, and still be unwinding its own destiny all the way. And this destiny, we have now to see, judging by the whole character of the way by which it was to have been reached, was only the idealistic continuation of the process which

achieves the normal life of man's civilized estate. The same line which runs from pre-civil to civil, when continued further, runs out into the ideal as here contemplated. And the reason, as mentioned at the beginning of the article, is that to reach the ideal here means to complete and articulate, or to complete through articulation.

For in one way or another it was the story of life—the life of man as mind or the life of the mind that is in man—which the idealistic dialectic essayed to give, beginning far beneath the ordinary normal life of our acquaintance, and ending far above and beyond it. Life was the theme, however little we may be able to recognize in the actual account given, the thing of which it is supposed to be the story.

But it was not Love, exactly, who in this case

Took up the harp of Life
And smote on all its cords with might,

striking it into that most unwonted music, the idealistic construction of experience. At least, in the case of Hegel's *Phenomenology* one would have to admit that it was at best but a drunken Love, and its strokes but heavy. Yet the same instrument was being struck by Hegel—to however different a tune—as Goethe had used or as the Romanticists had used or as later Carlyle was to use. It was the harp of life—normal human life.

Nor have its cords (quite entirely)

Passed in music out of sight,

even in the *Phenomenologie des Geistes*. For the *Phenomenology* is still a 'Life'—yes in the simple biographical sense of the term, a 'Life.' For what we have there, as has been excellently pointed out, *e.g.*, in one of the posthumous works of Royce,¹ is a kind of autobiography of the world-spirit; or perhaps more accurately, a great fugue on the theme, 'The Autobiography of the *Weltgeist*, the Nature of Things.'

¹ *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, edited by J. Loewenberg, Yale University Press.

Just as in Goethe's *Meister* or, in somewhat poorer fashion, in Novalis's *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* or, again, in a far more concentrated and brilliant way in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*, we are given a story of man—a recital of “incidents in the development of a soul”—and yet are given it in such form and fashion that we can never quite say whether it is intended as the psychological history of an individual or a quasi-metaphysical account of the nature of reality; so here we have a metaphysical account of the spirit of the universe (or of the spiritual universe) whereof nevertheless we can never be quite sure that it is not intended to be the psychological history of some possible person. There is a familiar estimate which we have been taught to make of Kant which would compel us to recognize in all of these things not any betrayal of him, but the sincerest unconscious tribute to the principle of his great work. If it was the work of Kant to show to man the world of nature as ‘bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh’ and as ‘no longer an alien clime but rather the very place of his soul,’ then we are warranted in saying that in all these works philosophical and literary, but especially in the Hegelian dialectical account of reality, that central word of the Kantian prophecy truly arises in power. For it is something very near to the heart of man which, as the principle of the dialectic, becomes the central principle of things. To repeat our thesis once more: the harp of life that was originally struck as man emerged into civilization itself is here only being struck again to further and to finer issues. The new tones are but the under- and the over-tones, the larger music, of which the normal mental life of man is the unadorned theme; that theme which it is the aim of the therapist to enable the individual to play again when, by reason of whatever kink or accident or tragedy, he has, once in a while, forgotten the way of it.

For the ‘Birth of Reason’ would appear really to have been on the above wise. The historical incident of man’s emergence into his rational and civilized estate would seem really to have been a process of the articulation of his spirituality; a disentangling of the congealed mass of his mere Being; a segregation of

his various accumulated powers into distinctness which was at the same moment a birth of those powers themselves.

It is in the very situation of man that he accumulate potentialities. This is the other side, the complementary truth, to Bergson's diffraction-story of evolution. The evolutionary process is, on one side, a process of accumulation. It is plainly, of course, a story of dispersion or diffraction. It is *prima facie* the latter. The general course of evolving life is *prima facie* like the flow of the blood from the heart or the rise of the sap up the tree. The stream goes along one main channel; this divides into branches; then the branches divide and further and further ramify until what was the one main stream has at length split itself up into all the multitudinous forms of life that we see. But the metaphor is not exact. As life is thus apparently dissipating itself, it is in another way accumulating. If the branching of the stream up a new channel represents the rise of a new species, there is still the story to tell of just what has happened at the fork. What is it that splits the stream—or bends it round? Metaphorically speaking it is an obstacle of some kind against which the stream had to impinge. But literally taken, the bending or forking of the course of life means that it is not the law for any species, whatever one we may choose to consider, to be permitted to go on generation after generation reproducing itself after the plan that the life and activities of each generation should be the mere changeless copy of the life and activities of the last. In the ultimate restlessness of the universe, there has been always liable to rise in every species a generation which found itself tackling a different world, negotiating some difficulty other than the foregoing generations knew, and consequently having to change to some extent the tenor of its going, re-adapt itself, develop new attitudes and powers, or, alternatively, go under. But as these forkings of the stream of life proceed; as one after one, the changing species leaves them behind; something is accumulating. There is accumulating a sum of mere Being, of which the birth of reason is the articulating-out.

For what, let us ask, literally speaking, becomes of the old adaptations and adjustments in any particular instance of a

change of environment, when the new circumstances have arrived and the old apparatus is no longer of service? What becomes of the water animal's equipment when it takes to venturing on the land? Or of the land animal's equipment when it slips back into the water? We may say that they gradually degenerate and decay. For so they do. But to say that and leave it there, is to miss the point of the process; at least if we intend to include among such adaptations our human passions and powers. For what becomes of these as man continues his slow ascent from the brutish estate to the savage and from the savage to the civilized is not that they decay but—that they go into the repertoire. They may decay, but first they lie there; and lie for countless generations. And that is the significant fact for man. His primitive adaptations are in his repertoire; and it is because they are there that he can emerge at all into his rational and civilized estate. For while in all animals such an accumulation of adjustments doubtless exists, it is characteristic of the human animal that the mere mass of them are disentangled, distinct, articulated. Doubtless animal reactions, like human, are drawn from all the ages. Doubtless the puppy dog as he sniffs along, nose to the dusty road, is, as has been picturesquely said, still sniffing for the pack that has long since disappeared; and the baying of the hound is but his vain call for help to his old mates of the primeval forest. Their reactions too are drawn from the depths of pre-historic time. But the difference is that each reaction, seen from within, is probably only an undifferentiated moment; while man's specious present is internally discrete. Man's moment spans the ages. He consciously is discrete, double, multiple. He is a conscious one of many. And as such—*only* as such—he emerges into his estate as a rational, civilized being.

Now just as the romantic literature which was contemporary with that of the idealistic philosophers virtually set itself the question: 'Of how many am I the one?'—a question degenerating only too easily, no doubt, into the wild question: 'Into how many can I make myself?'—so the philosophers, in endeavoring to delineate reality in a way which should exhibit the perfect logic of the life of the spirit at the same time, were setting them-

selves the problem: 'Of *what* many am I the one?' or rather: 'Given that I were all that I might be, given that I were free of these limitations of finitude, of what many *would* I be the one?' So that, just as man has articulated himself into the normal mental life of his civilized estate, so the post-Kantian idealistic philosophy, with its characteristically heaven-storming temper, would show him articulated further into the fulness of absolute or perfect being.

And this is why we say that the same line along which the individual mind is taken by the therapist's efforts to improve it, continued further, runs out towards that Good which Idealism has conceived. But we have not closed our case. We have still to consider with more care the road along which the therapist does conduct the individual mind in search of its good, and to show its coincidence in direction with the common highway along which man has travelled, and with that along which Idealism has bidden him travel further. This task, together with a summing up of the whole, is reserved for the third and concluding article of the series.

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